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AGENCY.

In Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. v. Fribley Hardware & Implement Co., 74 Pac. 237, the Supreme Court of Kansas holds
that the travelling salesman of a wholesale house
Authority
will be held to have the authority to bind his
principals by conditions attached to the sale made by him
when the sale is made, and if the conditions attached thereto
are reasonable and within the apparent scope of the salesman's authority, and notwithstanding his house was ignorant
of the conditions attached to the sale, and the agent, in fact,
did not have authority to sell on the conditions named.
Compare Babcock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 411.

ANTI-TRUST ACT.

A manufacturing corporation and its employee restricted
the sales of its products to those who refrained from dealing
in the commodities of its competitors by fixing
Restriction
of sales of the prices of its goods to those who did not thus
Goods
refrain so high that their purchase was unprofitable, while it reduced the prices to those who declined to
deal in the wares of the competitors so that the purchase of
the goods was pfofitable to them. The plaintiff applied to
purchase, but refused to refrain from handling the goods of
the corporation's competitors and sued it for damages caused
by the refusal of the defendants to sell their commodities to
him at prices which would make it profitable for him to
buy and sell them again. Under these facts the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) holds in Whitwel v.
Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 455, that the restriction
of their own trade by the defendants to those purchasers who
x67
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ANTI-TRUST ACT (Continued).

declined to deal in the goods of their competitors was not
violative of the Sherman Anti-trust Act of i8go. See
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 579.
BAILMENTS.

The Supreme Court of Georgia, laying down the general
principle that in order to create a bailment the bailee must
Labor Lien have an independent and exclusive possession of
the property, decides in Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. v. Baker, 45 S. E. 673, that where the owner of land
contracts with another to convert the standing timber into
cross-ties, and agrees to pay the workman twelve cents per
tie, the latter has no such independent possession as to create
a common-law lien on the ties for his labor expended, and
cannot maintain an action against one alleged to have negligently destroyed the same by fire.
BANKRUPTCY.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota holds in Shipley v.
Platts,97 N. W. i, that a laundry agent in a country town
Disdtarge: whose duties are to collect articles, forward
Debt of a
them to the laundry in the city, receive them
Fiduciary
back and distribute them, make collections and
remit to his principal, after deducting his commissions, the
agency having continued for more than a year, occupies a
fiduciary relation towards his principal. It is therefore
decided that under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Sec. 17, providing that a discharge shall not affect debts created by the
bankrupt's misappropriation or defalcation whili acting in
a fiduciary capacity, a discharge will not avail him against
his principal's claim for moneys not turned over. One judge
dissents.
The U. S. District Court (S. D. New York) holds In re
Filer, 125 Fed. 26r, that where a bankrupt caused a firm of
brokers to purchase stocks for his benefit, which
they held as collateral security for the money
advanced in making the purchases, the sale of such stocks
by them within four months prior to the bankruptcy for the
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purpose of liquidating his account did not create a preference, requiring the firm to surrender the sums received for
the stocks before proving their debt in bankruptcy.

BANKS.

In Interstate Nat. Bank v. Claxton, 77 S. W. 44, the
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas decides that where a bank
Deposit:
accepts a deposit from a patron known by it to
Trust Fund be insolvent at the time, with knowledge sufficient to put it on inquiry whether the fund belonged to the
depositors, it is liable to the true owner of the fund for the
amount of loss sustained by him where the bank permits the
fund to be diverted to other uses than the payment of the
owner. See Bank v. Moore, 79 Fed. 705.

BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

The by-laws of a beneficial association provided that each
member should pay certain dues, of which he should have
By.Laws

notice, and that if he failed to pay by the first
day of the next month he should stand sus-

pended and his benefit certificate be void. It was further
provided that no officer of the society should be permitted to
waive any of the by-laws, and that no act or omission on
the part of the officer authorized to receive payment of dues
should create liability on the part of the association. It *as
the invariabie custom of a local lodge to receive dues for
nearly a month after.the time when they became payable.
Under these circumstances the Court of Appeals at Kansas
City, Missouri, holds in Andre v. Modern Woodmen of
America, 76 S. W. 710, that a member who had knowledge
of such custom did not become suspended by failure to pay
dues until late in the month on the first of which they became
payable. See in connection with this case James v. Association, 148 Mo. i. Note also the very recent decision of
United Moderns v. Pipe, 76 S. W. (Texas) 774.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

In Packard v. Windholz, 82 N. Y. Supp. 666, the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth DepartAcommoda. ment) holds that where the holder of a note was
a bona fide holder for value it was not material
tion
Indorsement to a subsequent indorser's liability that he in-

dorsed the note merely for the maker's accommodation, and
that such fact was known to the holder. See also Lennon.
v. Grauer, 159 N. Y. 432.
CARRIERS.

In Parker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 45 S. E. 658,.
the Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that a contract
shpments :with a shipper of perishable fruit containing a
Subject to . clause "subject to delay," if intended as an
acceptance for shipment subject to delays arising
Delay
from causes beyond the carrier's control, merely expresses
a phase of the carrier's liability under an ordinary " owner's
risk" bill of lading, and if intended to relieve the carrier
from liability for delay arising from its own negligence, is
unenforceable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Sanders v.
Commonwealth, 77 S. W. 358, that an act of the state proDue Process hibiting the sale of milk from cows fed on "still
of Law
slop" is a regulation within the police power of
the state, and is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States declaring that
no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
though there is no evidence contradictory of the claim that
still slop is a wholesome food for dairy cows. See State v.
Layton, 61 S. W. (Mo.) i7i.
In Western Sash & Door Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co., 76 S.W. 998, the Supreme Court of Missouri (Division
Regulation No. 2) holds that the statute of the state proof Interstate viding that when a railroad company issues bills
of lading in Missouri it shall be liable for any
Commerce
loss, damage, or injury to the property caused by its negli-"
gence or the negligence of any-other carrier, when construed
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as depriving a carrier of the right to contract for a limitation
of its liability beyond its own line, is not in conflict with
Const. U. S., Art. i, Sec. 8, authorizing Congress to regulate interstate commerce. See also Railway Co. v. McCann,
174 U. S. 58o.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota decides in Harrisv.
Stearns, 97 N. W. 361, that a law of the state passed in 189o
Due Proces
providing that possession of the tax receipt shall
of Law
be conclusive evidence that all prior taxes on the
property have been paid and shall be a bar to their collection
is repugnant to the provision of the constitution that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; a county being, it is decided, a person,
and a tax property, within the meaning of the section. It is
further held that the provision is repugnant to the state constitution, declaring that all laws exempting property from
taxation shall be void.
CONTEMPT OF COURT.

In Ex parte McRae, 77 S. W. 211, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas holds that a mere effort to secure the
informatleu
as to Juror

service of a party to find out how a juror stands
in reference to a case then on trial does not

authorize punishment for contempt where the party so employed neither makes an effort to tamper with the juror, nor
holds out any inducement to the jury to decide one way or
the other, nor talks with the juror about the case.
The Supreme Court of Montana decides in State ex el.
Morse v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., 74 Pac.
Habeas
412, that a chief of police and his subordinates
Corpus
who, with actual knowledge that a writ of habeas
corpus had been issued for a certain prisoner under their
control, endeavored to avoid the service and execution of the
writ, and aided in delivering the prisoner into the custody
of a messenger from the governor of another state, under
extradition process, were guilty of contempt of court. In a
pr6ceeding for contempt of court it is held that the costs
cannot be charged to the contemners. See State v. District
Court, 24 Mont. 33.
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CONTRACTS.

It is decided by the New York Supreme Court (Special
Term, Warren County), Glens Falls Nat. Bank v. Van
PublicPollcy: Nostrand, 85 N. Y. Supp. 5o, that -where an
Unlawful
Guarantee

insolvent firm procured a third person to guar-

antee a debt at a bank on an indorsement of a
note, thereby inducing the bank to cancel the indorsement
and sign a compromise agreement for its claim without the
knowledge of the other creditors of the firm, the guarantee is
void, as against public policy, though the composition failed
because of the refusal of some of the other creditors to sign
the agreement. See Hanover Nat. Bank v. Blake, 142 N.
Y. 404.

The general nature of consideration is discussed in the
case of Dendy v. Russell, 74 Pac. 248, by the Supreme Court
Consideration: of Kansas, which holds that a promise to do an
sufficiency

act which one is not otherwise legally bound to

perform is a sufficient consideration for a contract to forbear action, notwithstanding the act is one apparently more
to the interest of the promisor than of the promisee, and notwithstanding that it may be difficult to ascribe a motive to
the latter for wishing it done. Compare with this case
Barnes v. Grugg, 28 Kan. 51.
CORPORATIONS.

The Supreme Court of Vermont holds in Buck v. Troy
Aqueduct Co., 56 Atl. 285, that a majority of the board of
Directors:
directors of a corporation has power-to bind the
corporation without the concurrence of, and
Majority
even without notice to, the minority.
Stockholders of an insolvent corporation compromised
with all but one of its creditors, receiving assignments of
Stockholders: their claims; and subsequently the creditor not
Double
joining in the compromise sued the stockholders
under the statute to enforce their double liability.
Liability
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that the claims
which, the stockholders held as assignees were entitled to
come in ratably with the debt of the creditor not participating in the compromise: Covington Stone & Sand Co. v.

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

CORPORATIONS (Continued).

Rosedale Electric Light Jockey Club, 76 S. W. 5o6. It is
further held that where the affairs of a corporation were so
managed as to constitute a fraud on creditors, individual
claims of the stockholders against the corporation accruing
prior to the claim of a bona fide creditor of a corporation
should not be allowed to participate ratably in a suit by such
creditor to enforce the double liability of the stockholders
under the statute.
DEDICATION.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky lays down in Riley v.
Buchanan, 76 S. W. 527, the two general principles that an
owner of realty who allows the public to use it
as a highway, under a notorious claim of right,
for a long period of years, is estopped from denying a dedication to the public, and that a dedication of a highway may
be impliedly accepted by long-continued user by the public.
DEEDS.

In State v. Clark, 76 S. W.

OO7, it is decided by the

Supreme Court of Missouri (Division No. 2) that it would
Statutory be beyond the power of the legislature to give
Requirements:
to an act making it a crime to give a deed to
Extra=
terrorial property previously sold or incumbered by the
Effect
grantor therein, without reciting in the deed the
former conveyances, an extraterritorial effect, as this would
in a measure regulate the conveyance in another state of
lands situated therein.
EVIDENCE.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department) holds in Deutschman v. Third Avenue R.
Cometency Co., 84 N. Y. Supp. 887, that a statute proof witnesses hibiting a physician from disclosing professional information acquired from a patient does not extend
to a druggist who fills physicians' prescriptions, nor does it
preclude a patient receiving a prescription from divulging
its contents; and therefore a druggist filling prescriptions
for a physician's patient may testify to that fact and identify
the prescriptions so filled, which prescriptions may then be
received in evidence.
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Notwithstanding the general principle that the consideration of a deed may be shown by parol, the Supreme Court
Parol
of Arkansas holds in Davis v. Jernigan, 76 S.
EvidenceRule W. 554, that where a deed recites a pecuniary
consideration parol evidence is not admissible to show that
there was no such consideration. See also Barnett v.
Hughey, 54 Ark. 195.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Hamilton v.
Michigan Cent. R. Co., 97 N. W. 392, that in a personal
Age of
injury case the opinions of experts as to plainAncestors
tiff's expectancy, based in part on mortality
tables and in part on the hypothesis that plaintiff resembled
his father and grandfather, who lived to advanced ages, are
properly excluded. See, however, Chattanooga R. Co. v.
Clowdis, 90 Ga. 258.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in State v. Snyder,
74 Pac. 231, that on the trial of a defendant for selling
Reag Eideace intoxicating liquor contrary to law a witness

for the state, who has testified to purchases of
beer from the defendant, which he drank, cannot be asked
on cross-examination to drink from a bottle of strange
liquor proffered him and then to state if such liquor is the
same as that he had previously purchased. See Gaunt v.
Harkness, 53 Kan. 405.
GIFTS.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides in Malone's
Committee v. Lebus, 77 S. W. I8o, that where the donee
Acceptance of a gift inter vivos is of unsound mind the law
will presume an acceptance.
HUSBAND

AND WIFE.

In Pache v. Oppenheim, 84 N. Y. Supp. 926, the New
York Supreme Court (Appellate Term) holds that a husSeputure
of Wife

band who, before administration of his wife's
estate, necessarily incurred and paid the reason-

able cost of his wife's sepulture is entitled to reimbursement
out of her estate. See Pattersonv. Patterson,59 N. Y. 574-
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INJUNCTION.

The New York Supreme Court (Special Term, Erie
County) holds in New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Reeves,
Muttaries..- 85 N. Y. Supp. 28, that a complaint in a suit by

a railroad company to restrain some sixty ticket
brokers in selling return round-trip tickets issued for an exposition at Buffalo, such persons having no connection with
each other, is bad for multifariousness.
ness

LARCENY.

The difficult questions that arise where an effort is made
to secure convicting evidence against a suspected person are
Consnt
dealt with by the Supreme Court of New York
of Owner
(Division No. 2) in State v. Waghalter, 76 S.
W. 1028. It is there decided, after a discussion of the
authorities, that there was no larceny where the taking from
the possession of a carrier was instigated by its agent, with
its full knowledge and consent, and pursuant to previous
arrangement with the agent, who was a detective, and who
instigated the taking for the sole purpose of entrapping the

taker and defendant, suspected of receiving stolen goods, to
whom the taker-was directed to carry them.
LIBEL.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Jackson v.
State, 77 S. W. 223, one judge dissenting, holds that where
at article is lengthy and contains matter that is
libellous with much that is not, an information
setting out the article in full and charging criminal libel
against the publisher is insufficient unless the libellous matter
is singled out and the prosecution based thereon. See-McArthur v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 635.
LIFE INSURANCE.

In Foster v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 125 Fed. 536,
the U. S. Circuit Court (E. D. Pennsylvania) holds that a
validity of person may effect insurance on his own life in
Contract good faith, paying the premiums therefor himself, and have the policy made payable to any beneficiary he
chooses, and in such case the company cannot set up the want
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of insurable interest of the beneficiary to defeat the policy.
Compare Carpenterv. Insurance Co., i6i Pa. 15.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

In Cobb v. Simon, 97 N. W. 276, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin lays down the general principle that retention of
Ratification the servant in the employ of a master after notice
of servant's to the principal of a tort committed by a servant
Act
is evidence of the ratification of the act by the
principal, but the information to the principal must be full
and complete.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

An action cannot be maintained against a municipality to
recover damages alleged to have been sustained by reason
Enforcement of the enforcement of the provisions of an ordiof Ordinances: nance to prevent the spread of smallpox and
Liability
other contagious diseases, unless it is made liable
therefor by the statutes or by ordinance: Supreme Court of
Nebraska in Village of Verdon v. Bowman, 97 N. W. 229.
The officers enforcing such an act, it is decided, act at their
peril, because if for any reason the ordinance is void, they
will be liable for the damages caused by their unauthorized
acts. See Dodge County v. Diers, 95 N. W. 6o2.

MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Eversberg
v. Supreme Tent Knights of Maccabees of the World, 77 S.
Amendment W. 246, that where a member of a mutual benefit
of By-Las insurance association agrees in his application
and certificate that the laws then in force or that may thereafter be adopted shall form the basis of his contract, and that
his benefit shall not be payable unless he shall have complied
with the laws then in force or that may thereafter be adopted,
he is bound by a subsequent amendment of the by-laws
amplifying the defence of suicide. One judge dissents. See
Supreme Lodge v. Trebbe, 179 Ill. 348.
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NEGLIGENCE.

The general rule that getting on or off a moving railroad
train is negligence per se is modified by the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas in St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of
A.lghtig
from Moving Texas v. Massay, 76 S. W. 585, where it is held
Trainthat it is not negligence as a matter of law for a
passenger to attempt to alight from a train which has begun
to move slowly after she. has- reached the- lowest step of the
car platform. The Court recurs to the general principle as
to what an ordinarily prudent person would have done under
the circumstances, See for a similar result in regard to
street railways the case of Dawson v. St. Louis Transit Co.,
76 S. W. (Mo.) 689.
PRYSICIANS.
In Wooley v. Bell, 76 S. W. 797, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas holds that a physician may not recover for
Recovery for professional services unless he shows compliance
Services
with the statute regtlating the practice of medicine.
PLEDGES.
By an agreement a paper company was to deliver all the
product of its mill to the plaintiffs, who were its selling
agents, as security for advances which were
Validity:
sufficiency made to it by plaintiffs, and such deliveries were
of Delivery
made as fast as the goods were manufactured to
a designated agent for the plaintiffs, who was also an employee of the company, and the product when so delivered
was placed by itself on the premises of the company and)vas
thereafter controlled by the agent, who shipped it from time
to time for sale when ordered by plaintiffs. Under these
facts the United States Circuit Court of Appeals (First
Circuit) holds in Dunn v. Troin, 125 Fed. 221, that under
the rule that there must be both delivery and continued possession to constitute a valid pledge as to third parties there
was such actual delivery and continued possession by the
pledgees as to render the pledge valid as against an assignee
in insolvency of the company with respect to the goods on
hand in, the custody of the agent when the assignee was
appointed. Compare Sumner v. Hamlet, 12 Pick. 76.

I76
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PLEDGE.

In Wilkins v. Redding, 97 N. W. 238, the Supreme Court
of Nebraska holdslthat where the amount of a debt is not in
Recovery o" dispute a tender of the amount is not bad because
Property:
coupled with a demand for the return of the
Tender f Deb. property, but must .be kept-good, .though it-may
still be on the same.condition;,. but where the amount,of'.the
debt is in dispute, a tender of any sum less :than, that claimed.
by the, pledgee, though equal to the .amount actually.due, is
not. good if. coupled with such a.eondition. . It is, further
decided that a, pledgee does not fQrfeit his. lien. by unsu.ccessfully .cntending that the,.equity. of redemption has been emtinguished by contract or by a sale under his right as pledgee.
Compare Lewis v. Mott, 36 N. Y. 3 9 5.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In Snell v. Goodlander, 97 N. W: 421, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota decides that an agent who is authorized by his
Duties and
principal to -sell property upon specified terms
Liabilities
is under legal obligation, upon learning, that
more advantageous terms could be obtained, the-facts concerning which are unknown to the principal, to communicate
the same td him before making, the sale' on the termspre
scribed. Compare with this case Holmes v. Cathcart,92 N.
W. 656, 6o L. R. A. 734-

SIDEWALKS.

-

-

The' New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Third Department) holds in Platt v. Village of Oneonta,
Right of
84 N. Y. Supp. 699, that where a village lays
Lot-Owners stones in the soil in front of a lot for the purpose
of using them as a permanent sidewalk they become a part
of the lot-owner's real property, and having been removed
by the village merely because he would not pay an assessment
therefor, it is liable to him for the, damage which he sustains.
Compare Niagara1Ealls Suspension Bridge Co. v. Bachman,
4 Lans. 523.'
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decides In re Sheldon's
Estate, 97 N. W. 524, that a void contract to convey real
Effect of Void estate by devise in consideration of services renContract
dered in devisor's family cannot be resorted to
for the purpose of measuring the value of the services rendered, but is ineffectual for any purpose except to rebut the
presumption that the services were gratuitously rendered,
and thus raise an implied contract to pay therefor. See also
Martin v. Estate of Martin, io8 Wis. 284.

SUPPORT.

The Supreme Court of New York decides in Pullan v.
Stallman, 56 Atl. i16, that where an owner permits the land
Adjacent
of an adjacent owner to be deprived of its lateral
Land-Owners support, he is not liable to such adjacent owner
for injuries sustained by the giving away of the soil under
his weight unless the removal of the lateral support was in a
negligent manner. See McGuire v. Grant, 25 N. J. Law
356.
TAX COLLECTORS.

The official undertaking of the tax collector which stipulates that the sureties will make good "all moneys that may
or shall come into his hands as tax collector"
Liability
of Sureties on that he does not faithfully account for, embraces
Bond
all tax moneys previously received which the
tax collector had on hand at the execution of the undertaking
and all moneys subsequently collected in his official capacity,
but does not include prior defalcations, if any, unless the
money had been restored at the time of the making of the
undertaking or was subsequently restored: Supreme Court
of Oregon in Lake County v. Neilon, 74 Pac. 212. It is
further decided that the fact that taxes were collected by a
tax collector under a defective warrant, or without a warrant, constitutes no defence to the sureties when sued for the
collector's conversion of the money so collected. See, in this
connection, the monographic note to Feller v. Gates,91 Am.
St, Rep. 492, 553, on "Acts for which Sureties on Official
Bonds are Liable."
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TOWNSHIPS.

An allowance by a township board of health to a physician
for services to a patient, for which the county is liable, is not
Allowance of invalid because he was a member of the board
Claim
and participated in the allowance: Supreme
Court of Michigan in Cedar Creek Tp. v. Board of Sup'rs,
&c., 97 N. W. 4o9.
TRUSTS.

The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas holds in Brown v.
Hooks, 76 S. W. 6o6, that where one forges a lease of land
Constructive belonging to another and receives rent thereTrusts
under such conduct does not create a constructive
trust in favor of the land-owner entitling him to the rents
received.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

The Supreme Court of Washington holds in Messenger v.
Murphy, 74 Pac. 48o, that a purchaser of property on the
Inst- went
instalment plan under a contract providing that
Contract
the title shall remain in the seller until the purchase price is fully paid, but binding the buyer to pay absolutely, may recover from a third person converting the property its full value, though he has paid but a portion of the
purchase price.
WILLS.
In Halde v. Schultz, 97 N. W. 369, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota holds that the interest of a divorced husInterest In an band in the estate of his divorced wife, continEstate
gent on the death of their minor child, is not
sufficient to authorize him to contest her will, the statute law
of the state permitting a contest only by a person interested.
Compare with this case the decisions of McDonald v. White,
130 Ill. 493, and In re Ensign, 103 N. Y. 284.

